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Abstract
Philosophical logic defined a metalanguage as a language
about a language. After that, the word ‘‘metapicture’’ was
used by Mitchell to identify a picture about a picture.
Once we are not dealing with language, we may think that
we are not dealing with signification. However, the word
‘‘meta’’ and its aboutness may assume that a picture has to
be interpreted and has a meaning. We think that this is not
accurate in order to understand the meta. The present
article proposes to define the meta as an aesthetic category
and not as a logical one. The analysis takes into account
viewers’ attention to self-referential works of art so as to
propose an embodied aesthetic analysis. We want to show
that the experience of meta in art is a reflective experience.
A picture is seen as a metapicture relative to the attention
that viewers have on it: they can or cannot see it as a meta-
picture. Obviously, activating the meta quality changes the
perception of the picture. One might think that the meta
quality is due to paradoxes. In fact, self-reference often
leads to paradoxes. We precisely want to show that para-
doxes are not a necessary ingredient to induce the meta
specific feeling. Why? Probably because the mere work is
not reflective; it is not a speech. The reflexivity that is
supposed to be in the work is actually the reflexivity of
the cognition of spectators projected in the work. Similarly
to Kant’s definition of the sublime, the structure ‘‘meta’’
lies in the subject, not in the picture. The experience of
the metapicture should actually be named as the meta-
experience of the picture.
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The main theme of this paper is to approach the
meta as an aesthetic category. This kind of
approach is unusual because of the close links
between meta and logic. The prefix ‘‘meta’’ is poly-
semic; it could mean ‘‘after,’’ as well as ‘‘beyond,’’
‘‘with,’’ or ‘‘about.’’ Although the origins of the
term ‘‘metaphysic’’ are discussed, the term ‘‘meta-
language’’ is clear. It is commonly admitted that a
metalanguage is a language applying to a language.
Thus, the terms ‘‘word,’’ ‘‘sentence,’’ or ‘‘comma’’
belongtoametalanguage.Weunderstandthatsuch
a language is used in relation with a first language.
The richness of the prefix is then clear, and in
this framework scholars develop various terms
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(page number not for citation purpose)constructed with the prefix understood in a logical
way: a meta-thing is a thing about the same thing.
Thus, pictures nested in other pictures are called
metapictures.Theword‘‘metapicture’’seemstobe
usedaccordingtoitslogicalmeaninginreferenceto
theword‘‘metalanguage.’’Themerefactthatsome
pictures are ‘‘metapictures’’ presupposes that the
picture is about something. Pictures may have
various objects, and some pictures (i.e. metapic-
tures) may be about pictures.
That is why metapictures are usually defined
through a field that envisages what pictures mean.
Even though Mitchell considered with caution the
relationship between metalanguage and metapic-
ture, he considered metapictures within the frame-
work of iconology.
1 Mitchell did not manage to
extricate himself from the logical framework; in
fact,thesetwofieldsaimatstudyingthemeaningof
signs. Mitchell was right when he said he did not
want to ‘‘derive a model for pictorial self-reference
from art or language,’’ but we think that he should
not have added ‘‘but to see if pictures provide their
own metalanguage.’’
2 He wanted to show that
pictures are ‘‘capable of reflection on themselves,’’
but they are not. He rightly wanted to bypass
the logical field, but he replaced it with ‘‘the
‘ordinary language’ view of pictures and images,’’
3
which is a kind of spectrum of logical metalan-
guage. A picture does not talk; we are not able to
listentoor toreadamessagefromit.Itis,therefore,
necessary to leave behind the hermeneutical pos-
ture that still seems fundamental to define meta-
pictures. It is all the more important to dispense
with the logical posture, contrary to what No ¨th
and, after him, Grishakova did.
4 This is necessary
in order to understand how metapictures affect
perceiving subjects and how one can aesthetically
experiment with the meta.
The main hypothesis is that a metapicture does
not have any ‘‘meta’’ quality, but its apprehension
activates a specific cognitive function that is based
upon an interweaving pattern. Held to be the
cause of this cognitive status, those pictures are
seen as metapictures. This structure articulating
subject and object is the same that Kant described
in the sublime: the vast ocean is not absolutely
large, but the effort made by the faculties of
subjects confronted with the vast ocean, mean-
while, is absolutely large. Furthermore, since all
aesthetic experiences are reflexive, that is to say
involving the same self-referential loop found in
the ‘‘meta’’ structures, aesthetic experiences gen-
erated by metapictures exemplify aesthetic experi-
ence in all its radicality.
First, we want to show that it is impossible to
consider pictures and metapictures without taking
into account the viewer’s attention and cognition.
Thus, a ‘‘metapicture’’ is not an objective concept
but a subjective and cognitive one. Then, we pro-
pose to describe the experience of metapictures
withoutusinglogicandmetalanguage.Metaisthen
qualified as a cognitive process so as to describe the
experience of metapictures as a metacognitive and
embodied experience.
SPECIFIC SUBJECTIVE ATTENTION,
PICTURES, AND NESTING PICTURES
At first, a metapicture seems patterned upon the
model of Russian dolls, as if there were a box
containing a doll. The doll is the content like the
nested picture, and the box is the container like the
metapicture. At first sight, only two elements
appear to be involved*the metapicture and the
nested picture*as if there were just container and
content. However, a metapicture involves several
elements, not only two. The other elements are not
new objects; they emerge from new kinds of
perception of the same objects as boxes or as dolls.
This principle is that a same object functions as
different elements depending on how it is consid-
ered. An additional element appears as soon as one
realizes that a box is not only a package, not only a
container, but also a doll, hence content. Russian
dolls, or nesting dolls, have trivialized the strange-
nessthatemergesfromsuchstructures.Indeed,the
basic situation of dolls nested within one another is
objectivelyaccurate.But,whenweareinterested in
the perception of these structures, things get
complicated. Perceiving an object as container
and perceiving an object as content respectively
represent two different actions. Thus, in thecase of
a doll inside another doll, there is the internal doll
seen as a doll, the external doll seen as a box, the
internal doll seen as content, and the external doll
seen as a doll. Through these different ways of
perceiving the elements, through these different
possible attentions to the perception of objects, the
perception of nesting dolls emerges. Metapictures
follow a similar process. An element seen as a
container cannot simultaneously be seen as con-
tent. Its function is not the same.
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(page number not for citation purpose)Inorder tobetterunderstandtheissuesrelatedto
the functionality of an object, we ought to remem-
ber that being a work of art is not a quality, but a
function,oftheobject.Anobjectisnotessentiallya
work of art; it needs to be implemented; ‘‘imple-
mentation [means] all thatgoesinto makingawork
work.’’
5 Thus, generally regarded as a work of art,
an object may not work as art in certain situations.
An example of this is the famous case of reciprocal
readymade by Marcel Duchamp. He suggests that
we use a Rembrandt painting as an ironing board.
And, conversely, an object that is not usually
recognized as art can be put in such a situation
that makes it workas a piece of art: The Bottle Rack,
created by Duchamp in 1914, or Campbell’s Soup
Cans produced in 1962 by Andy Warhol are two
famous examples of such a transfiguration of the
commonplace.
6 The situation in which objects
are activated to function as works of art is called
the ‘‘implementation’’ of the work by Goodman.
7
Wehavetoaddthatimplementation isnotradically
objective.Weusuallyhangphotographsofourholi-
days as we hang a painting, even as we hang pots
and pans on kitchen racks: the objective part of the
implementation is not sufficient to make an object
work as a piece of art. Implementing an object as a
work of art may be necessary for the activation of
someobjects,butitmightnotbeenough.Objective
criteria are not sufficient to define implementation
and activation. The cognitive attention by which
the viewer apprehends the object also has to be
taken into account. For example, two people fist
fighting in the street are seen in different ways if we
think of it as a street art performance or as a real
fight.
Of course, every work of art is not a picture
and every picture is not art, but the remark made
on the subjective and cognitive implementation
of a work of art can be applied to pictures. The
viewers’ attitude when they apprehend a picture
is highly critical: if they immerse themselves into
the picture, they temporarily inhibit the picture
qualities of representation in order to apprehend
the picture like a nesting presentation. On this
point, metapictures appear to raise the possibility
of such an immersion. Indeed, when one sees a
picture nested in another picture, a hierarchy of
representation seems to emerge: the picture in the
picture seems less real than the picture in which
it is located. In return, the overall picture seems
truer; it seems more real. Spectators seem to have
to set themselves in the virtual space represented
by the picture to see the internal picture as a
nesting representation. But the fact is that there is
only one picture. The painting represented in
L’Appel des cimes by Magritte in 1943 is painted
with the same paint as the rest of the painting.
8
Seeing a picture in another would mean neglecting
the distinction between pictures and represented
things, between signifier and signified. It would
mean forgetting the treachery of images that
Magritte stigmatized when he painted in 1929
‘‘Ceci n’est pas une pipe’’ (‘‘This is not a pipe’’)
under a picture of a pipe, in a work entitled The
Treachery of Images. Moreover, such a surface is a
picture for a subject injecting sense in it. There-
fore, this stratification of representation has no
objective legitimacy, or even a priori legitimacy.
This way of perceiving pictures stems from a long
historical and social development.
9 Strangely en-
ough, one seems ready to immerse oneself in
pictures; a picture is almost seen as the depicted
thing; the viewer loses the difference between
representation and presentation. We should not
neglect the level of representation. Another way to
realize the importance of the levels’ nesting of
representation is to stress that many artists exploit
edges of picture; they paint picture frames within
picture frames. These situations may have the
effect of increasing the illusion of the overall
picture or at least of asserting the distance of the
representation. In both cases, an effect is pro-
duced when one perceives imbrications. In order
to perceive imbrications, one must manage to
perceive the interaction of the strata: Magritte
used this self-reference in his paintings with an
easel that repeats the masked landscape, such as
L’Appel des cimes. The embedded paintings are not
randomly selected. An element must act on the
other. If one wants to understand their mode of
action, one cannot do without an interpretation.
But interpretation adds knowledge and high-level
cognitive processes to pictures, and once a picture
is decoded as a message, it seems not to be
understood as a picture anymore.
METAPICTURES AND INTERPRETATION
The main issue in metapictures is to establish
whether, when we consider the aboutness of a
metapicture, it remains a picture*or whether,
on the contrary, our attention moves away from
The meta as an aesthetic category
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‘‘message.’’ Viewers would see a metapicture either
as a picture or as something about a picture.
These two functions do not seem compatible, yet
they need to be in order to provide the experience
of the metapicture.
An interpretation seems necessary to get a
metapicture, but it may also prevent viewers from
perceiving a picture as a picture. Therefore, we
have to determine the conditions required for the
interpretation not to be a shift of the ‘‘picture.’’
Whereas language can quote words, a picture
cannot quote another picture in the same way.
Pictures do not constitute language. Most often,
viewers project onto the picture the speech they are
willing to confer to the picture. At best, the picture
would act as a mediator between the one who
produced itandthosewhoreceiveit:itwouldallow
the viewer to meet the intentions of the artist. Yet,
theproblemwithsuchapostulateisthatitraisesthe
picture as a degenerate form of speech, or at least a
non-complete form of speech. Thus, the picture is
no longer a picture. It would have to be decoded
anddeciphered,andbecomeatext,asifitcouldnot
stand on its own. We do not havetolook at pictures
and works of art as coded messages waiting to be
decoded; that would be regrettable. Yet, the prefix
‘‘meta’’ causes the crisis of the picture; it postulates
that a speech is required. But, the term is not
without meaning. It describes precisely pictures
thatusethemiseenabyme(i.e.picturesinwhichone
can see other pictures). Many examples could be
mentioned of this phenomenon because picture
nesting is an artistic way to exploit the porous
border between presentation and representation.
Itsmainfeatureseemstobethefactthatapictureis
necessarily a picture of something. Drawing a two-
dimensional representation in a picture allows the
artist to exploit the medium and manages to high-
light the difference between representation and
presentation. Therefore, painting metapictures
means managing to create pictures with a reflective
approach. Herein lies the difficulty: the ‘‘meta’’
seems to deny the characteristics of the picture as a
picture in order to relegate it as a proto-text; but,
simultaneously, it seems to be an efficient way to
achieve an understanding of what a picture is. This
ambivalence in the use of metapictures reveals
a problem that is specifically related to the recep-
tion of pictures. Thus, when one is looking at a
metapicture, does one apprehend it as a picture or
as something dealing with a picture? The question
has to be raised because attention is selective and a
dual focus seems difficult. Thus, once the ‘‘meta-
picture’’qualityofapicturenestinganotherpicture
is perceived, its quality as a picture fades away
to the benefit of the picture to which it relates.
This is not anymore a picture, but this is like a
speech. Conversely, since a picture does not pro-
vide speech, its qualities of meta vanish if the meta-
pictureisseenjustasapicture.However,theappeal
of the interpretation of a metapicture precisely lies
inthefactthattheinterpretationconcernsapicture
anddoesnotconcernsomethingelse.Therefore,to
apprehend a picture both as a picture and concern-
ing a picture, it has to be a self-referential picture.
Ahermeneuticattitudewouldnotbeanendinitself
inthis case, butit could be a means tocomplete the
understanding of pictures. Indeed, we have to
highlight the aesthetic specificity of metapictures.
Metapictures should deal with themselves and not
with another picture that is represented in them.
SELF-REFERENTIAL PICTURES AND
METAPICTURES WITHOUT INTERNAL
FRAME
At first glance, this possibility seems hardly
feasible: the picture should have to be embedded
in itself without any required frame. But the frame
is not inevitable for metapictures: since the view-
er’s attention is the most fundamental parameter
in order to make picture nesting, an internal frame
is not required to create metapictures.
For example, Fabio Rieiti has painted on the
Quai des E ´tats-Unis, in Nice, France, a mural
showing a landscape of the French Riviera with
blue sky and palm trees. The mural stands per-
penxdicular to the sea so that we can see both the
Mediterranean Sea and the painting. If the sea
is in front of us, the picture is on our right;
therefore, no one would be tricked by the painted
sea. A ladder put against the wall of the trompe-
l’œil and a painter currently completing a palm
tree are also shown on the mural. Thus, the
trompe-l’œil features the realization of another
optical illusion: the aim is not to make people
believe that the painted palm is a real palm but
that the painted ladder is a real ladder. This
picture is painted with two layers without any
internal frame. Undoubtedly, this mural would
not be seen in the same way without the shadow
B. Trentini
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depicted on the nesting representation of the
trompe-l’œil in order to make us believe that the
painter is painting the sea. But the painter and
the ladder are also painted. There is no internal
frame visible because it coincides with the outer
frame: the two pictures are embedded in the same
image. The nesting picture lies in the thickness of
the virtual picture and not in a portion of its
surface.
10 This mural brings to mind An Attempt
at the Impossible by Magritte in 1928: an artist is
represented in the process of painting a woman.
However, a fundamental difference persists: a
proper hierarchy is not possible in Magritte’s
painting. The painter and his painting share the
same virtual space; it is not possible to distinguish
them, even in the depth of what the picture
represents. Specifically, since the man is painting
the woman, she clearly lies in a level of reality that
is embedded in the man’s level, but what can we
say about the level of the place where the two
characters stand? The woman and the painter
seem to stand on the same floor. There are no
breaks in the floor. Oddly, the painter and his
painting are in the same environment. The title of
the work also draws attention to the possible
sharing of space, but once again, we have to
remember that the picture has neither space nor
depth, apart from those that a subject wants to
see. Since the painter and the painting share the
same virtual space, it is impossible to draw a line
between the two layers of representation. There-
fore, it is also impossible to draw a line between
the metapicture and the picture that is apparently
nested in the first one. Finally, a similar conclu-
sion can be proposed for pictures with internal
pictures: the drive to isolate a picture from
another picture means that we thought that the
internal picture would mask some part of the
whole image, a part that the viewer could easily fill
mentally. But nothing could be masked by any-
thing because everything evolves on the same
surface, the surface of the picture. Therefore, if
there is no distinction, why do we continue to talk
about metapictures? What could be nested, since
there is not more than one single picture?
Furthermore, we understand that the distinction
proposed by No ¨th between metapictures and self-
referential pictures is not applicable.
11 In fact, if
we cannot draw a line separating a metapicture
from the embedded picture, we will not be able to
distinguish between another picture in the picture
and the same picture in the picture: there is only
one picture, and it is the picture itself.
A metapicture can exist without internal frame;
therefore, a self-reference picture is possible. The
metapicture would be the only picture that could
be interpreted without disabling its iconic status:
as soon as a metapicture deals with itself as a
picture, a metapicture can be seen simultaneously
as a picture and as concerning a picture.
PARADOXES, METALANGUAGE, AND
METAPICTURE
The interest of the metapicture would lie in this
nestingoftheworkofartinitself.Intermsoflogical
vocabulary, it is as though metapictures induced a
paradox by breaching the laws of hierarchy, in a
similar way to Epimenides’ paradox of the Cretan
liarwhosays,‘‘I’mlying.’’Thisstatementis,infact,
really different from the proposal ‘‘The sentence of
Peter is false,’’ said by someone else. Yet both are
sentences that belong to metalanguage. The ques-
tion is whether or not the first seems more appeal-
ing because it is a paradoxical statement. It would
be perfectly normal to think so. Self-reference and
paradoxes are often associated; the second one is
like the limiting case of the first one; the paradox
points to the singularity of self-reference. Thus, all
this also indicates what makes it attractive. These
proposals led logicians to establish strict rules on
how metalanguage and object language could
interfere: the main rule is that we must banish the
paradox of the logical framework. This situation
probably marks the profound separation between
the two meanings of the term ‘‘meta’’: on the
one hand, in logic, and on the second hand, in
aesthetics as connected to the picture. Contrary to
what No ¨th proposed,
12 we should not model the
self-reference in pictures on logical paradoxes. In
fact,whileitistruethatinaneverydayconversation
we never hear a statement similar to ‘‘I’m lying,’’
and therefore that the paradoxical statement, in
addition to being a logical abnormality, has no
practical reality, it is also true that there is no law in
art prohibiting an artist from producing a picture
that seems paradoxical. Metapicture and logical
metalanguage are different. Many pictures by
Escher are depicting a paradoxical world. Here a
misleading perspective, there a concave volume
becoming convex; the paradoxical pictures of
The meta as an aesthetic category
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the metapicture quality of his pictures. However,
Drawing Hands, one of his most famous litho-
graphs, and an example taken by No ¨th, derives its
peculiar interest from its self-reference. This pic-
tureshowstwohandsdrawingeachother.Levelsof
reality are impossible; no linear hierarchy is plau-
sible; an inconceivable circularity is obvious: while
the picture seems to work as a whole, it cannot be
viewedinitsentiretyasapictureofsomething. The
picture is, therefore, not possible as a realistic
picture, but it is still perceived as a picture; it is
seen as a paradoxical picture.
Accordingly, an epistemological problem arises:
what context would be able to give us a full
understanding of the concept of ‘‘metapicture’’?
The logic certainly raises the use of the prefix, but,
whereas the logic radically distinguishes the me-
talanguage from the object language and prohibits
any proposal from intermixing them, the aesthetic
concern is interested in the possibility of articulat-
ing them in the same visual proposition. Hence,
the paradox vanishes: since there is no logical
framework to distinguish right from wrong, the
paradox itself loses its meaning. The place of self-
reference is the only remaining position, and the
statement ‘‘I am telling the truth’’does not exploit
metalanguage in a less self-referential way than the
proposal ‘‘I’m lying.’’ The inability to raise a level
in which one would be the ‘‘meta’’ of the other
persists, as if only the relationship between two
levels could generate metapictures. In this sense,
Escher’s Drawing Hands is compelling: assigning a
different level to each of the two hands would be
absurd because each needs the other. If the
attention focuses on the left hand as it draws the
right, the viewer apprehends the picture of a hand
in the process of drawing another hand. Both
hands are apprehended, but they evolve in two
different levels of reality. There is no problem in
this case to establish a hierarchy in the representa-
tion, but the viewer’s attention can switch and
reverse the hierarchy. Then, what are the two
levels of the picture? The structure patterned
upon the left hand on one side and the right
hand on the other side is meaningless; there are at
least two different ways of perceiving the picture.
Those two possible perceptions of the same
picture could be combined to give the impression
of a nested hierarchy. However, such a hierarchy is
not fixed; its order can change. In other words, it
is impossible to qualify a level of pure picture and
a level of metapicture, but different perceptions of
the picture might be articulated by the apprehen-
sion of the spectator. Hence, without two distin-
guishable levels in the picture, why do we even
talk about metapictures? The prefix ‘‘meta’’ does
not, actually, apply to the picture. The picture is
certainly strange, and it has a peculiar strange-
ness,
13 but there is nothing in the picture that is
‘‘on,’’ ‘‘beyond,’’ ‘‘with,’’ or ‘‘about’’ the picture;
there is no overlap in the picture. This observation
is obvious in the case of Escher’s lithograph, but
we must recognize that this picture is remarkable:
it is a metapicture without internal frame. Is it
possible to make the same observation for pictures
with an internal frame? We determined that a
picture was seen as a metapicture as soon as the
spectator perceived layers of representation, and
this happens with Drawing Hands. This picture
contains layers, but no nesting. Actually, the
hierarchy of layers is the problem: which one is
behind the other, and which one is about the
other? This question, in turn, obviously admits
answers neither posed about Escher’s picture nor
posed about a picture provided with an internal
frame. In this way, the first picture is about the
second one, but the second one is also about the
first one. Finally, which picture is about which?
According to the context, the spatial and graphic
overlapping seems to be preferred to the contex-
tual and hermeneutic one, but the mere fact that
both are considered indifferently shows the limits
of the conception of a metapicture as a picture
about another picture. This kind of retroactive
phenomenon disrupts any hierarchy of strata.
A Russian doll is perceived as sometimes internal,
sometimes external. The structure seems built in a
complex relationship that results in a reciprocal
exchange. With or without frames, there is no
overlap in the picture.
METAPICTURE AS METACOGNITIVE
AND EMBODIED EXPERIENCE
While there is no overlap in a picture, we cannot
make the same statement about cognition in these
pictures. In order to realize the strangeness of the
picture described as a metapicture, spectators
have to distance themselves from their perceptions
in order to collect these perceptions from the
inside. Thus, in this apprehension, the possible
B. Trentini
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experience of contemplation of our own percep-
tion of the picture becomes the aimless result. In
this case, a metapicture is actually a picture that
requires an act of metacognition, that is to say, a
cognitive process based on a nesting.
The metacognitive act is not a rare and isolated
case exclusively related to the metapicture. This
act is common and can take different forms. We
can, for example, assess our own knowledge,
realizing that we are or are not able to answer
some questions before we even seek the answer.
14
Knowing that we know or knowing that we do not
know forms a part of the daily metacognitive acts.
There is knowledge about knowledge. The meta-
cognition involved in the aesthetic experience of
metapictures takes a different form. Its cognitive
act not only involves the so-called high-level
processes, but also explains why an aesthetic
experience is possible: the metacognition does
not occur ‘‘intellectually, through the conscious-
ness of our intentional activity,’’ but ‘‘through the
mere inner sense and sensation.’’
15 In paragraph 9
of the Critique of the Power of Judgement, Kant
phrased in those terms one of the most funda-
mental questions of the analytic of the beautiful
dealing with the awareness of the free play of the
faculties of cognition. He wrote that the free play
of faculties reached the consciousness of the
subject through sensation.
16 We have to under-
stand the act necessary for metacognitive experi-
ence of the metapicture in this sense. Perceiving
subjects feel a particular arrangement of their
cognitive faculties; they see themselves as perceiv-
ing subjects. They perceive the dynamism of
their faculties, and the simple act of perceiving
emphasizes this momentum. All the elements of
a meta-structure are put together; we are still
to understand why such metacognition would
happen suddenly. Probably because the object
apprehended is difficult to determine. We must re-
member that the perception was primarily estab-
lished in order to ensure the survival of the living,
not to obtain knowledge of the world.
17 A basic
tendency is to identify what is perceived. In
addition, there is no doubt that the boundary of
representation tends increasingly to be dissolved
in the so-called low-level processes: the primary
reaction in front of such a picture of reality is
not different from a reaction to the mere thing.
Identifying a picture is identifying what it shows.
Therefore, a metapicture cannot be labeled. One’s
perception is lost once it is in front of this type of
visual proposition, as it can get lost while listening
to a pun. Since it is no longer able to identify an
object, the perception is no longer a means to
ensure survival through action, and therefore the
content of perception has no other alternative
than to become an end. Perception as a mechan-
ism becomes its own object. The experience of
metapicture gets all its aesthetic relevance simply
because it initiates a particular cognitive process
failing to clearly identify the object of its percep-
tion so as to optimize the action. Thus, a second
cognitive level emerges and intermingles with the
first one. When the perception is detached from
its connection to action, metacognition takes over.
We think that this description enables the under-
standing of the wildness of some metapictures like
the Duck-Rabbit.
18 We must not forget that
Mitchell classified multistability pictures in the
category of metapictures, although the first ones
are a very specific kind of picture. We think that
the link lies in the cognitive processes that are
required: the same cognitive loop emerges, and
the individual is used to externalizing this feeling
of cognitive loop.
This process seems to be the same for the
spectator of any aesthetic experience. This is
exactly what happens during the experience of
vertigo. Biologically, the perception of void alerts
human beings and enables them to make sufficient
arrangements to ensure their survival. Such sti-
mulations become meaningless when individuals
know that they are safe. Individuals can then focus
on their embodied sensations associated with
these stimulations, and then they can enjoy these
sensations or not without worrying about some
aims.
19 Becoming a spectator means becoming
the spectator of one’s own accession to the world.
This is essentially a reflexive posture because
movement returns to the subject. This structure
is rarely thought of in those terms when we enjoy
an experience described as aesthetic. But in the
singular experience of metapictures, this struc-
ture manifests itself in a conscious way precisely
because those pictures seem built like the involved
cognitive structure. Furthermore, metapictures
seem to embody objectively the reflecting and
subjective process of all aesthetic experiences. In
this sense, metapictures exemplify the aesthetic
experience.
The meta as an aesthetic category
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Once viewers have extracted the supposed content
of the work, what would remain of their relation-
ship to the work of art? Would they still apprehend
it as a work of art or just as any container that
might have a different look? If so, the interpreta-
tion would have no artistic relevance anymore.
Metapictures, because of their apparent about-
ness, may raise this issue more than other pictures.
However, the experience of metapictures is a rare
moment where one can apprehend a picture. The
viewer gets to see the picture as a picture, not just
for what that represents. Apart from metapicture,
this situation is certainly possible, but it happens
by highlighting the material cause of the picture,
such as a thicker stroke. But in these cases, the
picture is no longer just seen as a picture, but as
a painting, a drawing, or a photograph. On the
contrary, the singularity of the metapicture makes
it possible to see pictures just as pictures. However
paradoxical it may seem, apprehending a meta-
picture means experimenting with the picture in
an aesthetic way. ‘‘Aesthetic’’ because individuals
become aware of their own perceptions: their
experiences are reflexive ones. In fact, only some
appearances give the impression that the relation-
ship between the viewer and the metapicture is not
aesthetic. This is because the subject is confronted
with a picture that he or she cannot identify. The
viewer’s attention then turns to something other
than what the picture represents: a metapicture
acts as an attentional or pre-attentional decoy
enabling the individual to become a spectator.
Since being a spectator is primarily not being a
spectator of an object, but of one’s own means of
perception and cognition, the experience of the
metapicture should actually be named as the
meta-experience of the picture.
Kant points to the same analogy by using the
word ‘‘sublime.’’ According to the philosopher,
qualifying the nature as sublime is wrong.
20 The
sublimedoesnotlieinanobject,butinthefaculties
of subjects.
21 However, the transfer is done. This
situation is just like a hypallage in literature: the
predicate does not describe the thing to which it
refers grammatically, but it describes something
with which a relation is maintained. The term
‘‘metapicture’’ is a hypallage. Similarly to Kant’s
definition of the sublime, the structure ‘‘meta’’ lies
in the subject, not in the picture.
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